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Conley v. Gibson' s "No Set of Facts" Test:
Neither Cancer Nor Cure
Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I. INTRODUCTION

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court instituted a "plausibility" standard for assessing the
sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint-in the process disavowing Conley
v. Gibson's "no set of facts" test.1 Reaction to the new "plausibility"
standard has been generally critical, leading to calls for the reinstatement
of the "no set of facts" test. This essay argues that the "no set of facts"
test is a legal sufficiency test and thus inapplicable to the factual
sufficiency challenges in Twombly and Iqbal. As a consequence, the "no
set of facts" test is neither the cancer maligned by Twombly nor the cure
to Iqbal. Rather, this essay draws from the analytical distinction between
legal and factual sufficiency to propose a new factual sufficiency test:
Does the complaint allege sufficient facts to allow the court to assess the
legal sufficiency of the complaint?

*

Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Mary's

University in San Antonio, Texas. The author would like to thank Katy Stein, Faculty

Services Librarian, and Kelly Havner, a second-year law student at St. Mary's, for their
invaluable research assistance. She would also like to thank the students in Section B of
the St. Mary's Class of 2012 for putting up with their professor's obsession with pleading
standards.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (2009); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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Part II of this essay explains the distinction between legal and
factual sufficiency challenges to a complaint and applies this distinction
to Twombly and Iqbal. Part III demonstrates that the Conley "no set of
facts" standard is a legal sufficiency test. Part IV explains why Twombly
did not need to overrule the "no set of facts" test to institute a
"plausibility" standard, and Part V explains why the "no set of facts" test
is not a solution to the "plausibility" standard. Part VI draws from the
preceding sections to propose a new factual sufficiency test that would
work symbiotically with the legal sufficiency standard, and Part VII
briefly concludes.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a claim for relief
must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief"' 2 A pleading that fails to satisfy this test is
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for "fail[ing] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted."3
A pleading can fall short of this standard in two analytically distinct
ways: (1) by failing to assert a legally actionable claim (i.e., legal
insufficiency); and (2) by failing to allege enough facts (i.e., factual
insufficiency). 4 Twombly and Iqbal addressed the latter standard-not
the former.
A Legal Sufficiency
A pleading fails a legal sufficiency challenge if the complainant's
allegations, even if true, are not legally actionable.5 In Neitzke v.
2.
3.

FED. R. Cr. P. 8(a)(2).

FED. R. Cr.

P. 12(b)(6); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE

§ 1356 (3d ed. 2009) ("Thus, the provision [Rule

12(b)(6)] must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements

for pleading a claim for relief in federal court and calls for 'a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Only when the plaintiff's
complaint fails to meet this liberal pleading standard is it subject to dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6).") (citing authority).
4. See Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)
("Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory."); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CVIL
PROCEDURE

363 (7th ed. 2008) ("Pleading problems fall roughly into two groups. In one

group the underlying dispute is about the substantive law: What facts justify relief for this
kind of claim? In the other group there is no dispute about the content of substantive law,
but there is a disagreement about whether the facts pleaded justify relief under that

law.").
5.

5

CHARLES

ALAN

WRIGHT

&

ARTHUR

R.

MILLER,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

&

§ 1215 (3d ed. 2009) ("If the plaintiff does plead particulars, and they show
he has no claim, then the plaintiff has pleaded himself out of court.").
PROCEDURE
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Williams, the Supreme Court described this standard as follows: "Rule
12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a
dispositive issue of law." 6 Courts and commentators have characterized
successful legal sufficiency challenges as "relatively unusual",7 and
"extraordinary," 8 but, in fact, courts routinely dismiss claims at the
pleading stage for legal insufficiency. Recent examples include the
following:
*Dismissal of a claim asserted under 30 U.S.C. § 185(r)(2)(A)
because the statute does not create a private right of action. 9
*Dismissal of claims asserted under §§ 11 and 12(a) of the
Securities Act because the alleged misrepresentations are
immaterial as a matter of law. l1
*Dismissal of a negligence claim because Indiana's economic
loss doctrine precludes an action in tort for economic losses
arising from breach of contract.11
*Dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the alleged
conduct is not sufficiently
12
actionable.
be
to
outrageous
*Dismissal of a claim for negligent misrepresentation
because
13
"Virginia law does not recognize such a tort.,
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Neitzke, dismissal of claims
for legal insufficiency "streamlines
litigation by dispensing with needless
14
discovery and factfinding.,
B. Factual Sufficiency
A pleading fails a factual sufficiency challenge if the complainant
fails to allege sufficient facts in support of the asserted claims. Until
Twombly and Iqbal, courts dismissed a pleading for factual insufficiency
only if it failed to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
6.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989).
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2009).
8. Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441, 442 (1964) (quoting WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS 250 (1963)).
9. Riviera Drilling & Exploration. Co. v. Gunnison Energy Corp., No. 08-CV02486-REB-CBS, 2009 WL 3158163, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2009).
10. Landmen Partners Inc. v. Blackstone Group, L.P., 659 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544
7.

(S.D.N.Y 2009).
11. Hasse Construction Co. v. Gary Sanitary District Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 2:06-CV322-PRC, 2008 WL 2169000, at *6 (N.D. Ind. May 23, 2008).

12.

Hamilton v. Prudential Financial, No. 2:07-CV-00944-MCE-DAD, 2007 WL

2827792, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007).
13. JTH Tax, Inc. v. Whitaker, No. 2:07-CV-170, 2007 WL 2821830, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 27, 2007).
14. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).
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claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. 15 Under this standard, a
plaintiff was merely required to give "fair notice of the operative facts or
the gravamen of the statement for relief., 16 For example, courts
dismissed complaints under the "fair notice" standard in the following
cases predating Twombly and Iqbal:
Dismissal of gender discrimination claim where the plaintiffs
complaint failed to "identify her gender" or "allege any fact from which
to infer that
she was subjected to unequal treatment because she is a
1
woman."
Dismissal of a claim that "appear[ed] to be a legal malpractice
claim" where the plaintiffs failed to "identify the case which the
defendants allegedly failed to prosecute.""8
Affirming the dismissal of a First Amendment retaliation claim
where the plaintiff failed "to identify any activity on his part, even in the
most general terms, that triggered his termination." 19
Dismissal of a variety of claims based on alleged illegality of bank
loans where the complaint failed to "assert any details specifically
against each individual Defendant," "to allege that he was a customer of
each Defendant," "to identify the loans extended to him by each
Defendant," and "to identify any loans on which the Defendants
foreclosed. 20
As explained by the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A,
which predates Twombly and Iqbal, "[his simplified notice pleading

15. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1215 (3d ed. 2009) ("In federal practice, the test of a
complaint's sufficiency simply is whether the document's allegations are detailed and
informative enough to enable the defendant to respond.").
16. Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 456 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing supportive
authority); see CHARLES 5 ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1215 ("Of course, great generality in the statement of these circumstances
will be permitted as long as the defendant is given fair notice of what is claimed;
nonetheless, Rule 8(a)(2) does require that the pleader disclose adequate information
concerning the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he
wants relief and is entitled to it.").
17. Baldwin v. LIJ N. Shore Health Sys., 392 F. Supp. 2d 479, 483-84 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) ("This claim must fail because the plaintiff has not alleged facts which give the
defendant fair notice of her gender discrimination claim and the grounds upon which it
rests.").
18. Schwartz v. Steven Kramer & Assocs., No. 90-4943, 1991 WL 133507, at *2
(E.D. Pa. July 17, 1991) ("Count 3 fails to place the defendants on adequate notice as to
the plaintiffs' claim.").
19. Kyle, 144 F.3d at 457 ("Kyle's complaint fails to give fair notice to the court and
the opposing party of the operational facts of his complaint.").
20. Rudd v. Keybank, N.A., No. C2-05-CV-0523, 2006 WL 212096, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 25, 2006) ("Rudd fails to provide sufficient details to put Defendants on notice
of the claims he asserts against them.").
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standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions
to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious
21
claims.
C. Twombly and Iqbal
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal addressed the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. In Twombly, it was undisputed that if, as alleged in the
complaint, the defendants had entered into an agreement to "prevent
competitive entry" into their markets and "not to compete with one
another, 22 they would have violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, in Iqbal, no one disputed that if, as alleged in the complaint,
the defendants had "adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected
[the plaintiff]
to harsh • conditions
of confinement on account of race,
•,24
religon,
r naiona
religion,25or national origin,
they would have been subject to Bivens
liability.
Rather, Twombly and Iqbal turned on the factual sufficiency of the
plaintiffs' complaints. In Twombly, the issue was whether the plaintiff
had alleged sufficient factual support for the existence of an unlawful
agreement among the defendants,26 and in Iqbal, the issue was whether
the plaintiff had pleaded "sufficient factual matter to show that
petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue...
for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national
origin.
The first step in Twombly and Iqbal was to identify and disregard
mere "legal conclusions. 28 Thus, in Twombly, the Court disregarded the
plaintiffs' allegations that the defendants "entered into a contract,

21.
22.

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 551

(2007) (quoting the

plaintiffs' complaint).
23. See id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Thus, this is a case in which there is no
dispute about the substantive law. If the defendants acted individually, their conduct was
perfectly lawful. If, however, that conduct is the product of a horizontal agreement
among potential competitors, it was unlawful."); id. at 588 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The
Court does not suggest that an agreement to do what the plaintiffs allege would be
permissible under the antitrust laws. Nor does the Court hold that these plaintiffs have
failed to allege an injury entitling them to sue for damages under those laws.") (citations
omitted).

24. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
25. See id. at 1947-48 (recognizing the existence of a Bivens action "to redress a
violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment" and "assum[ing], without deciding, that respondent's First Amendment
claim is actionable under Bivens").
26. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
27. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49.
28. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
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combination, or conspiracy" and "agreed not to compete with one
another., 29 Similarly, in Iqbal, the Court disregarded the plaintiff's
allegations that the defendants "each knew of, condoned, and willfully
and maliciously agreed to subject" Iqbal to the confinement at issue "as a
matter of policy, solely on account of religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest;" that Ashcroft was the
"principal architect" of the detention policy; and that Mueller was
"instrumental in adoption, promulgation, and implementation."30
The second step in both cases was to identify the well-pleaded
factual allegations, assume their truth, and assess whether they "plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief" 31 In performing this plausibility
analysis, the Court emphasized that factual allegations that are "merely
consistent" with the element at issue are insufficient if a "more likely"
explanation exists.12 Thus, in Twombly, allegations of parallel conduct
among the defendants failed to satisfy the plausibility standard.33 The
defendants' "resistance to the upstarts" was merely "the natural,
unilateral reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional
dominance;" and the defendants' "competitive reticence" had "an
obvious alternative explanation. 3 4 Similarly, in Iqbal, allegations that
the FBI, under the defendants' direction, "arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men" and that the defendants approved a
"policy of holding post-September-ilth detainees in highly restrictive
conditions of confinement"
were consistent with purposeful
discrimination, but-"given more likely explanations"-the Court held
that these allegations failed the plausibility standard. 15 In short,

29. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (quoting the complaint); id. at 557 ("[A] conclusory
allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to
show illegality."); id. at 564 ("Although in form a few stray statements speak directly of
agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions resting on prior

allegations.").
30. Jqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint); id. at 1951
(disregarding these allegations as "conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true").
31.

Id. at 1950.

32. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (recognizing "[t]he need at the pleading stage for
allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement"); Jqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1950 (describing the Court's reasoning in Twombly) ("Acknowleding that parallel

conduct was consistent with an unlawful agreement, the Court nevertheless concluded
that it did not plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it was not only compatible with,
but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market
behavior.").

33. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (stating the "nub of the complaint"); id. at 570
("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.").
34. Id. at 566-68.
35. Jqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951.
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Twombly and Iqbal reinterpreted the 3"fair
notice" standard for factual
6
standard.
"plausibility"
a
as
sufficiency
III. CONLEY V. GIBSON'S ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL
SUFFICIENCY

Conley v. Gibson's "no set of facts" test is central to the debate
about Twombly and Iqbal. In Twombly, the Supreme Court, after
articulating the plausibility standard, explicitly disavowed the "no set of
facts" test.3
Moreover, some opponents of38 Twombly and Iqbal have
to the "no set of facts" test.
return
a
called for
Yet, the "no set of facts" test has been misunderstood by the
Supreme Court and many-but not al139-commentators.
As a detailed
examination of the case background and the Conley Court's opinion
demonstrate, the "no set of facts" test addresses legal sufficiency-not
factual sufficiency. As a consequence, the "no set of facts" test is neither
the cancer maligned by Twombly nor the cure to Iqbal.
A Case Background
In Conley v. Gibson, the plaintiffs, African-American union
members, filed a putative class action on behalf of similarly situated
union members, against their union and some of its agents.4 0 The
plaintiffs alleged that the union, in violation of the Railway Labor Act,
had discriminated against them on the basis of race or color by
segregating them "into a local union of the craft in which they are cut off
from and denied effective representation on a par equal to that afforded
to white employees who are members of the same craft or class."" In

36.

Id. at 1949 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.')
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
37. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
38. See Part V infra.
39. Professor Stephen B. Burbank, after conducting an in-depth analysis of the

Conley v. Gibson opinion, reaches the same conclusion as this author-that the "no set of
facts" test addressed legal sufficiency, not factual sufficiency. Hearing on Whether the
Supreme Court has Limited Americans'Access to Court: Hearing Before the Committee
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (Dec. 2, 2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B.
Burbank), available at http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/iqbal-portal/; Hearing on
Whether the Supreme Court has Limited Americans 'Access to Court: HearingBefore the
Committee on the Judiciary, Ilth Cong. 13-16 (Dec. 2, 2009) (Stephen B. Burbank's

Answers

to

Senator

Arlen

Specter's

Post-Hearing

Questions),

available

at

http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/iqbal-portal/.

40.

See Compl. § IV, Trans. of Record at 7, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)

(No. 7).

41.
7).

Compl. § III, Trans. of Record at 6, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No.
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particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the union refused to represent their
interests when their employer abolished 45 jobs held by AfricanAmerican employees and then immediately rehired white employees and
some of the previously fired African-American employees-with a loss
of seniority.4 2
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
National Railroad Adjustment Board had exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes involving collective bargaining agreements in the railroad
industry; (2) the suit was missing an indispensible party defendant, the
plaintiffs' employer; (3) the allegations about the agreement between the
employer and the union failed "to present a justifiable issue;" and (4) the
complaint "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 43
The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the first asserted
ground-lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 44 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment, without opinion ,4 and the Supreme
Court granted the petitioners' petition for writ of certiorari.46 In their
Supreme Court briefing, the respondents reasserted the grounds raised in
their motion to dismiss. 4 The Supreme Court, after rejecting the first
two grounds 4 addressed the respondents' sufficiency arguments, which
challenged both the legal and the factual sufficiency of the complaint.
B. Conley's Analysis of Legal Sufficiency
First, the respondents challenged the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, arguing that a union's duty to act without discrimination
"cannot be extended to the field of policing or administering agreements
and redressing individual grievances. 4 9 The respondents argued that the
union's duty to act without discrimination extends only to the union's
exclusive authority "to bind
the individual employee in contract
",50
carrier.
the
with
negotiations
42. See Compl. § IV, Trans. of Record at 11-12, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957) (No. 7).
43. Mot. to Dis., Trans. of Record at 17-18, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
(No. 7).
44. Conley v. Gibson, 138 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
45. Conley v. Gibson, 229 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1956).
46. Conley v. Gibson, 352 U.S. 818 (1956).
47. Brief for Respondents, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), available at 1957
WL 87662, at *4-5 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1957).
48. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957).
49. Brief for Respondents, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), available at 1957
WL 87662, at *30 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1957).
50. Id. ("In short, if the exclusive authority to act does not exist, neither does the

obligation.").
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The Supreme Court soundly rejected this legal sufficiency challenge
pursuant to the "no set of facts" test. First, the Supreme Court stated the
applicable test for assessing the complaint's sufficiency:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course,
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
51
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Applying this "no set of facts" test, the Supreme Court rejected the
respondents' legal sufficiency argument that the "duty not to draw
'irrelevant and invidious' discrimination among those it represents"
comes to an "abrupt end ...with the making of an agreement between
union and employer., 52 Rather, the Court recognized that collective
bargaining is an ongoing process, and the prohibition on discrimination
53
applies to the entire process.
C. Conley's Analysis ofFactual Sufficiency
The respondents also challenged the factual sufficiency of the
complaint, arguing that there was insufficient factual support for alleged
discriminatory conduct by the union. For example, the respondents
argued: "The factual allegations of the Complaint are completely vague
as to what provision of, or in what manner, the bargaining agreement was
violated by the Railroad when it abolished the particular jobs in question,
and equally vague as to how Respondents could 54have prevented such
action by the Railroad or successfully protested it.",
The Supreme Court rejected this factual sufficiency challenge
pursuant to the "fair notice" standard. The Court first clarified the
applicable test: "[A]ll the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of
the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 55 Applying this test, the
Court rejected the factual sufficiency challenge because the "petitioners'
complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair
56
notice of its basis.,

51. Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.
52. Id. (internal citation omitted).
53. See id.
54. Brief for Respondents, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), available at 1957
WL 87662, at *26 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1957); id. at *18 ("In short, with the single exception of
the allegations of the Complaint concerning the maintenance of a separate Negro Lodge

by the Brotherhood... the only acts of discrimination alleged by the Complaint appear to
be on the part of the Railroad ....
").
55. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
56. Id.
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D. Distinction Between Conley's Tests for Legal and Factual Sufficiency
In sum, the Conley Court addressed both legal and factual
sufficiency challenges. In addressing the former, the Court applied the
"no set of facts" test; and in addressing the latter, the Court applied the
"fair notice" test.
The three cases cited by the Supreme Court as authority for the "no
set of facts" test 57 further demonstrate that this test is properly
understood as a legal sufficiency test. In the first, Leimer v. State Mutual
Life Assurance Co., the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint because "[t]hat plaintiffs claim is barred by
estoppels and laches... does not conclusively appear from the facts
stated in the amended complaint., 5 The court contrasted the case at
hand with cases where a complaint is properly dismissed for legal
insufficiency: "Such a motion, of course, serves a useful purpose where,
for instance, a complaint states a claim based upon a wrong for which
there is clearly no remedy ....

"9

Similarly, in Dioguardi v. Durning,

the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint because "[i]t
appears to be well settled that the collector may be held personally for a
default or for negligence in the performance of his duties." 60 Finally, in
Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, the Third Circuit reversed the
dismissal of the complaint because, under the facts alleged, it was not "a
certainty" that the cause 61of action was unenforceable under the
applicable statute of frauds.
Subsequent courts and commentators have contributed to the
confusion between the "no set of facts" legal sufficiency test and the
"fair notice" factual sufficiency test by conflating the two standards and
treating them as synonymous. 62 Indeed, the Second Circuit in its
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 46n.5.
Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 108 F.2d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1940).
Id. at 305-06.
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942).

62. See, e.g., Jay S. Goodman, Two, New, U.S. Supreme Court Cases Raise the
Question: Is Notice Pleading Dead?, 58 R.I. BAR J. 5, 5 (Jan/Feb 2010) ("That rule
became known as notice pleading, as encapsulated in the rule that a 12(b)(6) motion had
to be denied if 'it cannot be said that there (is) no set of facts on which (a respondent)
would be entitled to relief."') (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47); Emily Sherwin, The
Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 How. L. J. 73, 73
(2008) (using ellipses to join the two tests); see also Patricia W. Hatamyer, The Tao of
Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 561-62
(2010) ("For decades, courts have started their opinions with boilerplate language about
the governing standards of a 12(b)(6) motion... Of course, courts frequently begin their
recitations by quoting Rule 8(a)(2). After Conley, the boilerplate language almost always

included that case's two best-known quotes: the 'no set of facts' quote and the 'fair
notice' quote.").
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Twombly opinion used the "no set of facts" test to assess the factual
sufficiency of the complaint, 63 which perhaps explains why the Supreme
Court felt the need to overrule the "no set of facts" test when overruling
the Court of Appeals in Twombly.
IV.

THE "NO SET OF FACTS" TEST IS NOT THE CANCER MALIGNED BY

TWOMBLY
In Twombly, after setting forth the "plausibility" standard for
assessing factual sufficiency, the Supreme Court expressly disavowed
the "no set of facts" test. 64 The Court reasoned: "This 'no set of facts'
language can be read in isolation as saying that any statement revealing
the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be
65
shown from the face of the pleadings."
Indeed, the "no set of facts" test would be unworkable as a factual
sufficiency test.
For example, a complaint alleging merely "the
defendant was negligent" would pass a "no set of facts" test of factual
sufficiency. Many courts and commentators have66expressed skepticism
about the "no set of facts" test for this very reason.
As shown above, however, the "no set of facts" test is a legal
sufficiency test. Since the issue in Twombly was the factual sufficiency
of the complaint, the Supreme Court had no need to address-let alone
overrule-the "no set of facts" test. Ultimately, the "no set of facts" test
is not the cancer maligned by the Twombly Court.
V.

THE "No SET OF FACTS" TEST IS NOT A CURE TO IQBAL

By the same token, the "no set of facts" test is not a cure to Iqbal.
Twombly and Iqbal instituted a "plausibility" standard for assessing
factual sufficiency. Reinstating the "no set of facts" test-a legal
sufficiency standard-would not overrule the plausibility standard. Yet
several legislative proposals attempt to do just that.
The Open Access to Courts Act of 2009 proposes to reinstate the
"no set of facts" test: "A court shall not dismiss a complaint under
subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to
6
relief." 7
63.

See Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).

64. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563
retirement.").
65.

"[T]his famous observation has earned its

Id.at 561.

66. See id. at 562 (citing courts and commentators that "have balked at taking the
literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard").
67. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Similarly, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 proposes to
reinstate "the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Conley v. Gibson." 68 The Conley v. Gibson opinion contains
both the "no set of facts" legal sufficiency test and the "fair notice"
factual sufficiency test, but this bill would most likely be interpreted as
reinstating the "no set of facts" test because, although Conley has been
cited for both tests, it is most famous for its "no set of facts" test.
According to Westlaw, Conley's "no set of facts" test has been cited by
courts 45,090 times, 69 while Conley's "fair notice" test has been cited by
courts only 7,063 times. 70 Additionally, the Supreme Court did not
explicitly overrule Conley's "fair notice" standard in Twombly and lqbal.
Indeed, in Twombly, the Court cited Conley with approval as the source
of the "fair notice" test. 1 Rather, the Court reinterpreted the "fair
notice" test as requiring plausibility.72 Therefore, even if the bill were
understood as reinforcing the "fair notice" test, it would not necessarily
follow that the Twombly/Iqbal gloss on the "fair notice" standard would
be overruled.
VI. REFORM OF FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY TEST

The "plausibility" standard in Twombly and Iqbal has been roundly
criticized, v perhaps most compellingly because it denies court access to
prospective plaintiffs with meritorious claims but without the resources
to gather proof without the benefit of discovery. As explained above,
however, reinstating the "no set of facts" test would not accomplish the
desired reform.

68.
69.

Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 1504, 11ith Cong. (2009).
See Westlaw.com (last visited February 20, 2010). West Headnote 5, containing

the "no set of facts" test, has 45,090 case citations.
70.

See Westlaw.com (last visited March 5, 2010).

No West Headnote directly

states the "fair notice" test. Therefore, the author ran the following terms and connectors
search in the "allcases" database: (conley gibson) /50 "fair notice." This search generated
7,063 results.
71. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
72. See id. at 570.

73.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.

PENN STATI 1 (2010), available at http://pennstatelawreview.org/114/114 Penn Statim
1.pdf; see also Symposium: Pondering lqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1-450 (2010)
(compiling numerous scholarly critiques of Jqbal).
74. See Hearing on Whether the Supreme Court has Limited Americans' Access to
Court: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, lIlth Cong. 11 (Dec. 2, 2009)

(prepared

statement

of

Stephen

http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/iqbal-portal/.

B.

Burbank),

available

at
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A. Reinstatement of "FairNotice" Test of FactualSufficiency
Certainly the most obvious reform would be to reinstate the "fair
notice" standard for factual sufficiency as it was interpreted before
Twombly. For example, Professor Stephen Burbank in testimony before
Congress proposed the reinstatement of "interpretations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
by lower decisions consistent with such interpretations, that existed on
May 20, 2007."
Draft legislation to this effect is currently pending
before the Senate. 6
The "fair notice" factual sufficiency standard has always been
somewhat problematic, however, because it renders superfluous Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), which allows a party to move for a more
definite statement if a pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response."
Moreover, the existence of
separate legal and factual sufficiency standards, which do not work
symbiotically, results in a disjointed interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2),
perhaps best exemplified by the Twombly and Iqbal opinions.
B. Proposal for a New Factual Sufficiency Test
This essay proposes that, rather than merely reinstating the old
factual sufficiency test, Congress take this opportunity to reassess the
appropriate factual sufficiency standard. As explained above, factual
sufficiency and legal sufficiency are analytically distinct. Rather than
operating as different frameworks, however, the factual sufficiency test
and legal sufficiency test should work symbiotically.
In particular, this essay proposes the following factual sufficiency
test: Does the complaint allege sufficient facts to allow the court to
assess the legal sufficiency of the complaint?
Rather than focusing on "fair notice" to the defendant, who has
resort to Rule 12(e) if unable to discern the plaintiffs allegations, this
factual sufficiency standard would focus on notice to the court. Indeed,
some district courts already include themselves as part of the intended
75. Hearing on Whether the Supreme Court has Limited Americans' Access to
Court: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. App. A (Dec. 2,
2009)
(prepared
statement
of
Stephen
B.
Burbank),
available
at
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/iqbal-portal/.
76. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2010)
(proposing an almost identical standard).
77. FED. R. Cr. P. 12(e); see Hearing on Whether the Supreme Court has Limited
Americans' Access to Court: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. App. A (Dec. 2, 2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (arguing that
factual sufficiency should be tested only under Rule 12(e)), available at
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/iqbal-portal/.
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audience to whom "fair notice" must be given.7 The crucial inquiry in
assessing whether a pleading affords the court sufficient notice would be
whether the court possesses enough information about the plaintiffs
version of events to determine whether the complaint is legally
sufficient. v
Applying this standard to Twombly and Iqbal, both complaints
would survive dismissal because they apprise the court of the plaintiffs'
versions of events, thus enabling the court to rule that - assuming the
veracity of the plaintiffs' versions-the claims are legally actionable. In
other words, assuming that the Twombly defendants had entered into an
agreement to "prevent competitive entry" into their markets and "not to
compete with one another,"80 they would have violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act.81 Similarly, assuming that the Iqbal defendants had
"adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected [the plaintiff] to harsh
conditions of confinement on account of race, religion, or national
origin, ' , 82 they would have been subject to Bivens liability.83
By the same token, a complaint that merely alleges that "the
defendant was negligent" would fail this standard because, without an
understanding of the plaintiff's version of events, the court would be
unable to assess whether the claim is legally actionable.8 4 For example,
78. See, e.g., Gregory v. TCF Bank, No. 09-C-5243, 2009 WL 4823907, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 10, 2009) ("The purpose behind Rule 8 is to ensure that both the defendant and
the court have fair notice of the claims alleged.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added);
Potts v. Pike County Sheriff's Office, No. 2:09-CV-974-ID, 2009 WL 3747213, at *2
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2009) (stating that, in order to comply with Rule 8(a), a complaint
must "provide [] fair notice to the court and a defendant of the claim against the
defendant") (emphasis added); McCarthy v. Stollman, No. 06-Civ-2613, 2009 WL
1159197, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2009) (stating that a pleading "must give the court and
the defendant fair notice of what [the] plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Rourke v. Rhode Island, No. 09-10S, 2009
WL 1160255, at *2 (D.R.I. Apr. 27, 2009) ("One of the primary purposes of Rule 8(a) is
to give the defendant(s) and the Court fair notice of the claim being made by a plaintiff.")
(emphasis added).
79. Accord Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986) ("Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that the sole purpose of pleadings is to give notice, this Article
suggests that their role should be to enable courts to decide cases on their merits.").
80. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 551 (2007) (quoting the
plaintiffs' complaint).
81. Id. at 571.
82. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
83. Id. at 1947-48.
84. See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEx.
L. REV. 1749, 1770-71 (1998) (recognizing that courts may vary the level of factual detail
required at the pleading stage depending on whether additional factual allegations will
resolve the case); id. at 1771 ("Even though Palsgraf was also a claim for negligence,
such a delphic complaint cries out for inclusion of more details, not only to give
defendant notice but also to permit the court to scrutinize the legal sufficiency of
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in most jurisdictions, if the plaintiffs negligence claim sought purely
economic damages for breach of a contractual duty, the economic loss
rule would bar the claim.8 5 Therefore, the plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts to allow the court to assess whether, under the plaintiff's version of
events, the negligence claim survives the economic loss rule.
Under this proposal, factual and legal sufficiency tests would
operate symbiotically to allow the court to dismiss claims that are not
actionable under the plaintiff's version of events, thus "dispens[ing] with
needless discovery and factfinding. ' ,1 6 At the same time, this proposal
would reopen the courthouse doors to plaintiffs with meritorious claims
but without the resources to compile their evidence without the aid of
discovery. Finally, under this proposal, defendants whose only quibble
is the lack of notice to themselves would have to resort to a Rule 12(e)
motion for more definite statement rather than rely on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss.
VII. CONCLUSION

Several conclusions follow from the analytical distinction between
factual and legal sufficiency and the classification of the "no set of facts"
test as a legal sufficiency test. First, the Twombly Court's disavowal of
the test was unnecessary. More importantly, efforts to reverse Iqbal by
reinstating the "no set of facts" test are misguided. Rather, if Congress
wishes to reverse the plausibility standard, it should do so with a factual
sufficiency test. One example is to reinstate the "fair notice" standard
without a "plausibility" gloss. This essay proposes that, rather than
merely reinstating the pre-Twombly standard, Congress should enact a
factual sufficiency test that works symbiotically with the legal
sufficiency test. In particular, this essay proposes the following factual
sufficiency test: Does the complaint allege sufficient facts to allow the
court to assess the legal sufficiency of the complaint?

plaintiff's claim in terms of the necessary elements of foreseeability and proximate
cause.").
85. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 526 (2009).
86. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).

